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The Indigent Prisoner's New Hope: The
Old Writ of Habeas Corpus and
the Right to Counsel
WALTER A. RAFALKO*
"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
some countries, but it is in ours."
Black, J., in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
INTRODUCTION
As Blackstone pointed out in his "Commentaries on the Laws
of England," the sole injury to personal liberty is false imprison-
ment., The means of removing the actual injury of false im-
prisonment are fourfold: 1. By writ of mainprize.2 2. By writ de
odio et atia.3 3. By writ de homine replegiando.4  4. By writ of
habeas corpus.5  The last writ is the one most celebrated in
*B.S., St. Louis University, LL.B., Boston University, LL.M., Georgetown Uni-
versity, J.S.D., John Marshall University. Member of the Missouri, District of Columbia,
Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court Bars. Professor of Law, Duquesne Uni-
versity.
1. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 1125 (Lewis's ed. 1897).
2. Ibid. "The writ of mainprize, manucaptio, is a writ directed to the sheriff (either
generally, when any man is imprisoned for a bailable offence and bail has been refused;
or specially, when the offence or cause of commitment is not properly bailable below),
commanding him to take sureties for the prisoner's appearance, usually called mainpernors,
and to set him at large."
3. Id. at 1125-1126. "The writ de odio et aria was anciently used to be directed to the
sheriff, commanding him to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was corn-
mitted upon just cause of suspicion, or merely propter odium et atiam, for hatred and
ill wiil; and if upon the inquisition due cause of suspicion did not appear, then there
issued another writ for the sheriff to admit him to bail."
4. Id. at 1126. "The writ de homi e replegiando lies to replevy a man out of prison
or out of the custody of any private person (in the same manner that chattels taken in
distress may be replevied, * * *) upon giving security to the sheriff that the man shall
be forthcoming to answer any charge against him."
5. Ibid. "But the great and efficacious writ, In all manner of illegal confinement, is
that of habeas corpus ad subjiclendum; directed to the person detaining another, and
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, ad faciesdum, subjiciendum, et recipiendum, to do, submit to, and
receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that behalf."
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English law.6 Contrary to popular opinion, it is not a criminal
remedy but an extraordinary civil remedy. It commands the per-
son detaining another to produce the body of the prisoner. Its
purpose is to remedy all forms of illegal confinement. This writ
assumed a new significance in Gideon v. Wainwright7 wherein the
Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right of the assist-
ance of counsel is applicable to state trials by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment. The appellant had been tried and convicted
of a felony and was sentenced to serve five years imprisonment
in the state prison. The Supreme Court granted the appellant's writ
on the above basis. Since this case the courts are now being
flooded with similar petitions.
The famous Habeas Corpus Act of England" is frequently con-
sidered as another magna carta of the British Kingdom. 9 This
statute reduced the general methods of proceedings on these writs
to the true standard of law and liberty. It was brought to America
by the colonists and claimed by them as the great bulwark of
liberty.10 On the adoption of the Constitution, the writ was em-
bodied in that instrument as a limitation on the powers of the
federal government.- In addition, there are similar prohibitions
on the part of states in their constitutions. 1 2 As in most instances,
these constitutional provisions are not self-executory and require
legislative implementation both at the federal's and state14 levels.
As the court pointed out in Corn. ex rel. Levine v. Fair,15 a habeas
corpus proceeding, the provisions of the statutory writ did not dis-
place the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and
the common law writ is more extensive in scope and may be
applicable in situations not within the statutory writ provisions.
This article attempts to investigate some of the habeas corpus
problems, viz., some basic considerations, state and federal release
procedures, the right to counsel guarantee, and the waiving of the
constitutional right to counsel by the accused.
6. Ibid.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 3 Car. II, C. 2.
9. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 1132 (Lewis's ed. 1902).
10. People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. (Sickles) 559, 566 (1875).
11. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 9.
12. "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses
when the proof is evident or presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it." Pa. Const., Art I, § 14. For a listing of states with identical and
similar Provisions, see Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University,
Index Digest of State Constitutions 517 (2d ed. 1959).
13. 62 Stat. 964, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948).
14. Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 415, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901; Act of July 1,1937, P.L. 2664, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1892; Act of Feb. 18, 1785, 2 Sm. L. 275,§ 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1871.
15. 394 Pa. 262, 146 A.2d 834 (1958).
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I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
What should be the policy of the courts with regard to the
petitions of habeas corpus? Should they be construed liberally or
strictly? Since there is a conflict between the right of the mem-
bers of society to be protected and the wholesale release of prison-
ers by habeas corpus, this policy issue has become extremely
important. The trend seems to favor the liberal approach of
granting the writs of habeas corpus. In Com. ex rel. Goodfellow
v. Rundle,18 a habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated that ". . . our courts must read inartfully
drawn petitions liberally in favor of the petitioner. . . ." Also, in
Com. ex rel. Harbold v. Myers,17 the same court stated, "We have
no intention of departing from our purpose to solicitously insuring
that rights constitutionally conferred are not unduly forfeited."
A. When the Writ of Habeas Corpus Will Not Issue
A very important rule is that the writ of habeas corpus can-
not be utilized as a substitute for a motion for new trial or an
appeal from conviction or to correct the alleged errors of the trial
court.' Defects and irregularities in the indictment, warrant, and
proceedings before the magistrate are cured by pleading to the
indictment and going to trial.19 Furthermore, it is well settled that
the defects and irregularities in the information are waived by
pleading to the indictment and going to trial. 20
The cases are legion in which the courts have said that a writ
of habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal, a writ of error,
a motion for a new trial, or for the correction of any trial irregu-
larities.2 1 The regularity of proceedings before a magistrate or a
grand jury cannot be questioned by the writ of habeas corpus. 2
In Com. ex rel. Walls v. Maroney23 it was held that a prisoner
convicted of first-degree murder was not entitled to habeas corpus
relief on the ground that he had been denied a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate, in view of the fact that the record disclosed
16. 415 Pa. 528, 532, 204 A.2d 446, 448 (1964).
17. 417 Pa. 358, 366, 207 A.2d 805, 809 (1965).
18. Spaulding v. Taylor, 336 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1964); Brisson v. Warden of Con-
necticut State Prison, 25 Conn. Sup. 202, 200 A.2d 250 (1964); Com. ex te. Walls v.
Maroney, 416 Pa. 290, 295, 205 A.2d 862, 865 (1965). See Com. ex rel. Wilkins v. Ban-
miller, 401 Pa. 347, 164 A.2d 333 (1960); Com. ex rel. Kennedy v. Myers, .393 Pa. 535,
143 A.2d 660 (1958) ; State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson, 129 N.W.2d 712 (S.D. 1964) ; State
ex rel. Kunz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1964).
19. U.S. ex rel. Realmuto v. Fay, 230 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. N.Y. 1964); Com. cx rel.
Lockhartv.Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 165 A.2d 400 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 860,
(1961) ; Estes v. State of Tennessee, 381 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1964).
20. Breeden v. Nielsen, 127 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1964) ; Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania v. Bruno, 203 Pa. Super. 541, 201 A.2d 434 (1964).
21. O'Banion v. Iaskins, 1 Ohio St. 2d 110, 205 N.E.2d 16 (1965) ; Coin. ex rel. El-
liott v. Baldi, 373 Pa. 489, 493, 96 A.2d 122, 124 (1953), cert. denied 345 U.S. 976 (1953)
Pyles v. Boles, 135 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1964).
22. Com. ex rel. Simcox v. Johnston, 182 Pa. Super. 407, 127 A.2d 790 (1956), cert.
denied 355 U.S. 933 (1958).
23. 416 Pa. 290, 205 A.2d 862 (1965).
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that he was held for action by the grand jury as a result of a
hearing or inquest conducted by the coroner.
The relator may not complain by petition for habeas corpus
about the consolidation of the indictments for trial. Consolidation
of indictments charging separate and distinct offenses for trial is
largely a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and, if
no prejudice is shown, the defendant cannot complain.2 '
A court's refusal to postpone a trial in order to have defense
witnesses present is not the subject of relief in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Hence, such an allegation is, also, without merit. 25
The sufficiency of the evidence and any trial errors which
could have been considered and corrected on appeal are not
remediable or the subject of relief by habeas corpus. 2
Whenever a judgment of conviction is attacked collaterally in
habeas corpus, the complaining party has the burden of clearly
establishing the facts which would justify the conclusion of lack of
due process which he asserts. 27 A prisoner is not entitled, there-
fore, to habeas corpus relief or to a hearing thereon on the basis
of an allegation that a state witness conspired to and did commit
perjury where there is no showing of any intentional fabrication or
suppression of the truth. 2 To support the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel,
it must be found that counsel's conduct amounted to a denial of
due process of law. 29
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ten years after a mur-
der conviction, failed to substantiate the claim that the prisoner
had not received a fair trial because of the prejudicial attitude
in the community from news media publicity, where no motion
was made for continuance of the trial or a change of venue and a
jury was selected without any unusual difficulty.30 It has been held
that habeas corpus is not available to attack a conviction on the
grounds that a confession was coerced, that the trial judge was
prejudiced, that one of the jurors was a personal friend of the
warden of the county jail, that the conviction was obtained as a
result of perjured testimony, or that the evidence was insufficientA1
An illegal arrest, even if excessive force was used, does not,
24. Ali v. Heinze, 41 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1964) Com. ex rel. Bey v. Myers, 190 Pa. Super.
63, 152 A.2d 921 (1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 905 (1960).
25. Com. ex rel. Graeser v. Myers, 189 Pa. Super. 198, 150 A.2d 380 (1959).
26. Supra, n. 24.
27. U.S. ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964); Jackson v. State of
Idaho, 392 P.2d 695 (Idaho 1964) ; Langdon v. Thomas, 384 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1964)
Com. ex rel. Storch v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263 (1964).
28. Gandy v. Watkins, 237 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Ala. 1964); In re Lessard, 42 Cal.,
Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39 (1965) ; Corn. ex rel. LaRue v. Rundle, 417 Pa. 383, 207 A.2d
829 (1965) ; Ex parte Washburn, 383 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Cr. App. 1964).
29. Ibid.
30. Corn. ex rel. Storch v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263 (1964).
31. Corn. ex rel. Baerchus v. Myers, 194 Pa. Super. 377, 165 A.2d 754 (1961).
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without more, amount to a denial of due process or furnish
grounds, after conviction, for discharge on a writ of habeas corpus- 2
Where the prisoner has pleaded guilty in open court, he can-
not challenge the propriety of that court in accepting his plea.
His assertions of unlawful detention prior thereto do not afford
justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.3 3 It has
also been held that a prisoner is not entitled to release from cus-
tody in a habeas corpus proceeding because of the alleged fact
that he was held incommunicado, without charge, before conviction. 4
It is well established that an arrest may be made by a police
officer where he has reasonable and probable cause to believe that
the person arrested has committed a felony.3 5 If the record in a
case discloses ample evidence to sustain a finding that the arrest-
ing police officers had reasonable and probable cause to believe that
the prisoner was involved in the crime in question, then the prisoner
is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.36
B. When the Writ of Habeas Corpus Will Issue
On the other hand, the recent tendency of the courts, especially
the Supreme Court of the United States, has been to relax the
general rule that a writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for
an appeal, a writ of error, a motion for a new trial or the correction
of trial errors, and to widen the scope of due process so as to
allow a writ of habeas corpus when the interests of justice im-
peratively require itA7 However, as was pointed out in Common-
wealth ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy3" there should exist an imperative
necessity or apparent reason why expedition is desirable or required
before permission is granted to proceed by original jurisdiction in
a habeas corpus application. It has also been held that the statute
requiring the payment of a filing fee on appeal is constitutional as
it applies to habeas corpus cases. 9
Where the court record shows a trial, sentence, or plea which
was so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a denial of due process
or the other constitutional rights of the accused, habeas corpus will
lie. 40 There is a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process
32. Com. ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, 106 A.2d 587 (1954).
33. Jones v. State of Montana, 231 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. Mont. 1964) ; White v. Crouse,
396 P.2d 333 (Kan. 1964) ; Com. ex rel. Grierson v. Ashe, 353 Pa. 1, 44 A.2d 239 (1945),
cert. denied 327 U.S. 790 (1945).
34. Smith v. State of Idaho, 391 P.2d 849 (Idaho 1964); Gifford v. Maxwell, 202
N.E.2d 424 (Ohio 1964); Com. ex rel. Bolish v. Banmiller, 396 Pa. 129, 151 A.2d 480(1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 898 (1959).
35. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, (1959).
36. Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Com. ex rel. Walls v.
MaroneY, 416 Pa. 290, 205 A.2d 862 (1965).
37. Supra, n. 21. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ; U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
344 U.S. 561 (1953) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
38. 366 Pa. 282, 77 A.2d 350 (1951).
39. Com. ex rel. Whalen v. Banmiller, 192 Pa. Super. 134, 160 A.2d 126 (1960).
40. Supra, n. 21.
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clause"1 if an involuntary confession is introduced at a criminal
trial in a state court.42  Under the due process clause, a defendant
is entitled to effective representation and competent counsel. This
concept of effective representation or competent counsel must be
strictly construed and the absence of effective representation means
representation so lacking in competence that it becomes the duty
of the court or prosecution to correct it, so as to prevent a
mockery of justice. 4  The constitutional right of the defendant to
be present at every stage of the proceedings in a murder prosecu-
tion was not violated even though the coroner's inquest was conduct-
ed in the defendant's absence. 4  A lack of counsel at any critical
stage of a proceeding is a violation of the constitutional right of the
accused under the sixth amendment.' 5 It has further been held
that a relator who had not been represented by counsel at a guilty
plea hearing and had made no statement concerning his guilt did
not waive counsel and was entitled to habeas corpus and a new
trial.46 However, without showing prejudice to an accused, the
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage and the accused was
not denied his constitutional guarantee to counsel when he was
given a preliminary hearing before the committing magistrate with-
out the benefit of representation by counsel.' 7 Today, the interroga-
tion by the police officers which normally precedes the preliminary
hearing may be a critical stage and, under certain circumstances,
denial of assistance of counsel may be a violation of the accused's
constitutional rights. 8
Any evidence seized as a result of illegal search and seizure
in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible at the criminal
trial of an accused if the introduction of such evidence would be
prejudicial to the rights of the accused and would be a basis to grant
the writ of habeas corpus.49 However, if the introduction of such
evidence would not be prejudicial to the rights of the accused,
the illegal search and seizure is not a basis for issuance of the
41. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
42. Jackson v. Deno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
43. People v. Palmer, 31 I1. 2d 58, 198 N.X.2d 839 (1964); Com. ex rel. Crosby v.
Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 202 A.2d 299 (1964) ; Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 232, 135 S.E.2d
823 (,964) ; State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82, 128 N.W.2d 422 (1964).
44. U.S. v. Abrams, 35 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. N.Y. 1964); Com. ex rel. Linde v. Maroney,
416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965).
45. U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
46. Rohrer v. State of Montana, 237 F. Supp. 747 (D.C. Mont. 1965) ; Coin. ex yel. John-
son V. Maroney, 416 Pa. 451, 206 A.2d 322 (1965).
47. Warner v. Com., 386 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. 1965) ; Mathews v. State, 237 Md. 479, 206
A.2d 714 (1965); State v. Small, 386 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1965); Rainsberger v. State, 399
P.2d 129 (Nev. 1965) ; Com. ex rel. Maisenhelder, 414 Pa. 11, 198 A.2d 565 (1964). Cf.
Pointer v. Texas, 85 S. Ct. 1064 (1965), 33 L. W. 4306 (1965), where the sixth amend!-
ment constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses Is incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment so that the testimony given in a preliminary hearing, where there was no
counsel to cross-examine the witness and the witness Is now out of the jurisdiction, was
not admissible at the trial.
48. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433(1958) and Cicenla v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) were distinguished.
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Com. ex rel. Ensor v. Cummings, 416 Pa. 510,
207 A.2d 230 (1965).
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writ of habeas corpus.5 0 In addition, in the case of an arrest and
search without a warrant or with an invalid warrant, but where
there is found to be probable cause for the arrest, such evidence
and its fruits are admissible. 51 Probable cause exists where the
facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are suf-
ficient in themselves to warrant the belief in a man of reasonable
caution that an offense has been committed.5 2 The failure to raise
the issue of illegal search and seizure at the trial may constitute
a waiver of one's constitutional rights.55
It should also be kept in mind that a conviction in violation
of a state, as well as the federai, constitutional prohibition may
be a basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.H
It is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained
of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.5 5 How-
ever, when a person is in the custody of a constable, he is being
restrained of his liberty, and if the restraint is due to a malicious
prosecution initiated for an illegal purpose, there is no question
that habeas corpus lies to determine his rights in the matter.56
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the relator has the burden to
prove facts which would entitle him to relief. In other words, the
presumption of regularity must be overcome by the relator.5 7
Where an order of commitment to prison is beyond the power
or jurisdiction of the tribunal entering it, the one wrongfully de-
tained may secure a release on habeas corpus.58 Obviously, the
relator should have some redress if he was sentenced under either
a mistake of law or a mistake of important material facts which
were discovered after sentence and could not by reasonable dili-
gence have been discovered before sentence. A possible remedy
under such facts is the writ of habeas corpus.59
II. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE IN STATE COURT
An implementing statute usually sets forth the venue and pro-
cedure requirements for any prisoner seeking to obtain release from
50. Supra, n. 35.
51. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
52. Id. at 35.
53. Supra, n. 49.
54. State v. Heiter, 203 A.2d 69 (Del. 1964) ; Brown v. State, 207 A.2d 103 (Md. 1965)
Com. ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814 (1965); Tyson v. Henlng, 205
Va. 388, 136 S.E.2d 832 (1964).
55. State v. Clark, 132 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1965); Com. ex rel. Maisels v. Baldi, 172
Pa. Super. 19, 92 A.2d 257 (1952); 25 AM. JUR., Habeas Corpus, § 24 (1940).
56. Supra, n. 15.
57. Application of Alexander, 393 P.2d 882 (Okla. Cr. 1964) ; Com. ex rel. Howard v.
Claudy, 175 Pa. Super. 1, 102 A.2d 486 (1954) ; State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d
290 (Tenn. 1964).
58. Woodson v. Bennett, 128 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1964) ; People ex rel. Rich v. Katner,
43 Misc. 2d 450, 251 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1964); Com. ex rel. Penland v. Ashe, 341 Pa. 337,
19 A.2d 464 (1941).
59. Supra, n. 21.
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confinement by the writ.60 Any judge of trial court within a state
has jurisdiction at any time to issue a writ of habeas corpus. For
example, in Pennsylvania jurisdiction is obtained upon application
by or on behalf of any person alleged to be unlawfully imprisoned
or detained in any penitentiary, prison, mental institution, or other
place (1) within the judge's judicial district, or (2) outside of his
judicial district, if the relator was committed by action of any
court of the judge's judicial district.6- An application for a writ of
habeas corpus shall be by petition, which shall set forth the venue,
the factual basis, and shall be duly verified by the relator or by
someone on his behalf.62  Upon presentation of a petition, the cur-
rent practice is to attach a rule to show cause. If it is granted,
the relator gets a hearing.6 ' In ordering the writ to issue or in
avoiding a rule to show cause, the judge fixes a date for a hear-
ing, which is held as promptly as possible and may or may
not order the relator to be produced at the hearing, as the cir-
cumstances may warrant.6"
A relator's petition for the writ of habeas corpus may be denied
without a hearing when no issues of fact are raised. Under such
circumstances, the matter may be determined on questions of
law.6 5 Repetitious petitions for habeas corpus may be dismissed
without a hearing when they are employed as devices to secure
appellate review of adjudicated matters.66  A petition may be dis-
missed without a hearing where the petition itself or the record
upon which it is based, or both together, fail to clearly make out
a case entitling relator to relief.6 7 A petition for a writ may be
dismissed without a hearing if the defendant has been at all times
represented by counsel, even though another counsel makes the
post-trial motions. The petitioner is not entitled to a release on
habeas corpus if this is nothing more than an attempted device
to secure an appellate review of previously adjudicated matters.68
The scope of the hearing on habeas corpus constitutes an in-
quiry into the legality of the restraint imposed by the defendant.
But the relief from illegal restraint is not limited to cases falling
within the scope of the criminal code, and hence, no matter what
may be the situation or how involved the circumstances, any person
claiming he is illegally restrained of his liberty may have such
claim inquired into by a competent court, and, if his claim is
60. For Pennsylvania as an example, see Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 451, § 1, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1901-1907.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1951).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1903 (1951).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1904 (1951).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1905 (1951).
65. Blair v. People of State of Cal., 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Curtis v. Bennett,
131 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1964) ; Com. ex rel. Camara v. Myers, 201 Pa. Super. 496, 193 A.2d
642 (1963).
66. Supra, n. 31.
67. Corn. ex rel. Whalen v. Banmiller, 193 Pa. Super. 554, 165 A.2d 421 (1960).
68. Corn. ex rel. Hendrickson v. Hendrick, 193 Pa. Super. 559, 165 A.2d 261 (1960).
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found to be well grounded, he will be discharged and freed of such
restraint.69
As to the burden of proof at the hearing, in a habeas corpus
proceeding for a release from a state penitentiary, the burden was
on the prisoner (relator) to establish the truth of the material facts
entitling him to relief.1 0 Thus, when a judgment of conviction is
attacked collaterally, the complainant has the burden of clearly
establishing the facts which would justify the conclusion of lack
of due process which he asserts. 1
The judge or court before whom the writ of habeas corpus is
returned has the power to issue subpoenas and all other process
to compel the attendance of witnesses.1 2 The judge may inquire
and examine into the facts of the case, 73 the record of all the
proceedings held, and inquire into the facts by receiving evidence. 4
After the hearing, the judge can dismiss the writ, order the
discharge of the relator, or make such other order as shall be
appropriate. 75 From the decision of the judge an appeal may be
taken.76
On appeal, the appellate court's examination of the record is
not restricted to inquiry as to whether there is any evidence sup-
porting the order, but rather whether the order has sufficient sup-
port in competent evidence. 77
III. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURTS
The power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. 8
A federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court
trier of fact has, after a full hearing, reliably found the relevant
facts. This means that a federal court has the power to compel
production of the complete state-court record of a habeas corpus
petitioner, who claims he is without the benefit of counsel, and the
record should show the pleadings, the transcript of testimony, the
court opinion, and other pertinent documents to determine whether
the habeas corpus applicant received a full and fair hearing re-
sulting in reliable findings. 79 Thus, it may be possible for prisoners
sentenced by state courts and confined in a state penitentiary, under
proper circumstances, to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
69. Supra, n. 15.
70. Cor. ex rel. Sawchak v. Ashe, 169 Pa. Super. 529, S. A.2d 497 (1951), cert. denied
341 U.S. 980 (1952).
71. Supra, n. 27.
72. Act of April 17, 1866, P.L. 112, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1875.
73. Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2264, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1892.
74. Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2264, § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1893.
75. Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 415, § 6, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1906.
76. Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 415, § 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1907.
77. Nelson v. Standefer, 390 P.2d 838 (Idaho 1964) ; Com. ex rel. Carlini v. Burke, 172
Pa. Super. 116, 92 A.2d 267 (1952) ; State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 131 N.W.2d 81 (S.D.
1964).
78. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
79. U.S. ex rel. McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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federal courts. A hearing on plea of guilty is a critical stage in
the proceedings against an accused and one in which a need for
counsel is most urgent. Whether there has been a voluntary and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel at this hearing is one
such circumstance. 80
Some federal and state courts now hold that the right to counsel
principle of Gideon v. Wainwright"1 is retrospectively applicable. 2
In the federal courts, an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by an idigent state prisoner shall not be granted unless it appears
that the relator has exhausted the remedies available in the state
courts.8 In Townsend v. Sain, the U. S. Supreme Court set forth
six situations in which it felt the federal courts must grant a
plenary evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus application:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-
finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state-
court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
and fair fact hearing. 84
If the federal court decides that the indigent prisoner's consti-
tutional rights were invaded either by his conviction and sentence
without counsel or by the acceptance of his plea of guilty without
counsel, it will then determine as a matter of comity in the main-
tenance of the delicate balance of judicial power between the state
and the federal whether it should remit the prisoner to the state
court for his remedy now available there, or should itself, without
further delay, afford the relief sought.8 5
Where the writ of habeas corpus is granted by the federal
court because the guilty plea has been entered without an intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel and because the defendant had
not been adequately informed of the nature of the charges, retrial
in the state courts is not precluded by the constitutional guaranty
against double jeopardy. 6
In Jackson v. Denno,8 7 the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus asserting that the New York procedure for de-
termining voluntariness of a confession was violative of the due
80. Ibid.
81. Supra, n. 7.
82. U.S. ex rel. Craig v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1964); Corn. ex rel. McCray
V. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964).
83. 63 Stat. 105, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1949).
84. Supra, n. 78 at 313.
85. Supra, n. 70.
86. U.S. ex rel. Shebodnik v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir. 1965); Rice v.
Comm., 387 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1965) ; State v. Anderson, 262 N.C, 491, 137 S.E.2d 823 (1964).
87. Supra, n. 42.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that his confession
was involuntary. It was held that the petitioner is entitled to a
state court hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of the confes-
sion, by a body other than the one trying his guilt or innocence,
and was reversed and remanded for a hearing or a new trial.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Ever since Gideon sounded his trumpet in a non-capital c a s e
and the constitutional guaranty to the assistance of counsel was
held to apply at the state level, there has been, as there was
bound to be, a tremendous increase in the number of applications
for the writ of habeas corpus.
The constitutional basis of the indigent prisoner's right to coun-
sel in federal prosecutions is the sixth amendment of the federal
Constitution, and in state prosecutions the fourteenth amendment.
With the advent of Powell v. Alabama,"" a rape case, it was
held that failure to give reasonable time and opportunity to secure
counsel prior to trial to illiterate youths away from their home
and family charged with a capital offense in Alabama, against
whom popular hostility was so aroused that it was necessary to
keep them confined and under military guard, infringed the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, a non-capital case, the Supreme Court
held the right to assistance of counsel is a fundamental right es-
sential to a fair trial and the indigent defendant's trial and con-
viction without the assistance of counsel violated the fourteenth
amendment. Betts v. Brady8 9 was expressly overruled wherein it
had been held that due process of law does not require that in
every case, regardless of circumstances, an indigent accused must
be furnished counsel by the state.
In Massiah v. United States, ° the defendant, while free on bail,
held a conversation, in the absence of his counsel, with a co-defend-
ant while sitting in the co-defendant's car, unaware that the co-
defendant had decided to cooperate with the government agents
and had allowed them to install a radio transmitter under the seat
of his automobile, by means of which a federal agent listened in
on the conversation. At the defendant's trial the federal agent,
over the defendant's objection, testified to incriminating statements
made by the defendant during the conversation, and the trial re-
sulted in the defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court held that
under the sixth amendment's guaranty of the defendant's right to
assistance of counsel, the defendant's incriminating statements
88. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
89. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
90. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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elicited by the federal agents after he had been indicted and in
the absence of counsel were not admissible at his trial.
In Escobedo v. Illinois,91 a murder case, the trial court admitted
into evidence incriminating statements made by the accused during
police interrogations conducted before the accused was formally in-
dicted for the crime. The police did not inform the accused of
his right to remain silent, denied his request to confer with his
counsel, and informed him they had convincing evidence of his
commission of the crime. The Supreme Court held that under the
particular circumstances of this case, the police investigation hav-
ing reached the accusatory rather than the general investigatory
stage, the refusal to honor the accused's request to confer with his
counsel constituted a denial of his right to assistance of counsel
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments and the state trial court
should not have admitted the incriminating statements into evidence.
As has been previously mentioned, the rule of the Gideon case
is to be retroactively applied, even on a guilty plea, unless the ac-
cused has waived his right to counsel.9 2 Waiver may not be found
from a mere plea of guilty,03 from, appearance of the accused with-
out counsel,94 from failure to request counsel, 95 and it may not be
presumed from a silent record.98
This right to counsel commences at least at a "critical" stage
of a criminal proceeding. It may be at a "preliminary hearing"
under Maryland law97 or an "arraignment" under Alabama law,98
where pleas are entered, and the absence of counsel at these
stages violates the accused's rights under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
The right of the accused to have this aid of counsel for his
defense includes the right to have sufficient time to advise with
counsel and prepare a defense in advance of trial.9
Apparently, the right to counsel may even attach earlier than
the "critical" stage of entering a plea at the preliminary hearing
or the arraignment; such as where the accused being put under
arrest, requested to speak to counsel and was denied the right by
the police, subsequently made a confession after arrest but before
being taken to police headquarters. The confession was admissible
because the Supreme Court found the accused (a former criminal
law student) not fundamentally prejudiced by the denial of his re-
quest for counsel. 100 Today, the accused need not even be under
91. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
92. Supra, n. 16.
93. Rice v. Olson, 32.1 U.S. 786 (1945).
94. Ibid.
95. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
96. Ibid.
97. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
98. Hailmton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
99. Supra, n. 88.
100. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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arrest. In the case of Escobedo v. Illinois,101 the accused was not
under arrest but was under investigation as the prime suspect.
He had a lawyer, whom he had requested to see, in the next room
trying to see him and he had not been warned of his right to
remain silent by the police. He then made an incriminating state-
ment to the police which was introduced against him at the trial.
His conviction was reversed on the basis that he was denied the
assistance of counsel.
This right to counsel which the indigent defendant has in a
state criminal case at the trial level now carries over to an appeal
before an appellate court. Failure to so allow this right to counsel
at an appeal by the indigent defendant constitutes a discrimination
between rich and poor which is violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1
0 2
State court cases interpreting and construing the Escobedo and
Massiah cases are on the increase. 0 3 Four recent cases were:
People v. Dorado,104 People v. Hartgraves,0 5 People v. Stanley06 and
Commonwealth v. Patrick.107
In People v. Dorado, a malicious assault with a deadly weapon
case, the California court held that once the investigation focused
on the defendant, any incriminating statements given by the de-
fendant became inadmissible in the absence of counsel and by
failure of the police officers to advise the defendant of his right
to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. The defendant's sub-
sequent confession obtained in such a manner would be inadmis-
sible even though he had not made a formal request for counsel,
a fact which was definitely present in the Escobedo case.
The Hartgraves case, where defendant was convicted of arson,
is definitely contra to Dorado. The Illinois court interpreted the
Escobedo case, but held in the instant case that a confession was
admissible even though the defendant was not advised of his right
to remain silent nor of his right to confer with counsel. The Illinois
court stated these two facts were only attendant circumstances
which the accused is entitled to have appropriately considered in
determining voluntariness and admissibility of his confession.
The People v. Stanley case was a first-degree grand larceny
case. The defendant was arraigned, indicted by the federal grand
jury for a federal crime, entered a plea of not guilty and was
released on bail, whence the city police immediately took him into
custody and questioned him in the absence of counsel. Their conduct
101. Suvra, . 1.
102. Douglas V. California, 372 U.S. 50 (196.3).
103. National Legal Aid and Defender Association. DEFSNDER NEWSLETTER, March 1,
1965, Volume IT, No. 2.
104. 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 94 P.2d 9.52 (1964).
105. R1 T1I 2d 175, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
106. 15 N.Y.2d 30, 203 N.E.2d 475 (1964).
107. 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965).
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was held to be not improper because of the defendant's federal
arraignment and indictment, and the incriminating statements made
by him during the questioning were admissible in the state criminal
proceedings.
In Commonwealth v. Patrick, a first-degree murder case, the
Pennsylvania court cited and followed People v. Hartgraves and
People v. Stanley. The court concluded that a statement or con-
fession made during interrogation by the police, if voluntarily made,
may be constitutionally admissible in evidence even though the
accused was neither warned of his right to counsel nor to remain
silent.
Thus, the state courts on this issue are going both ways, with
the majority taking the position that confessions voluntarily made
during police interrogation may be admissible even though the ac-
cused is not warned of his right to silence or counsel.
Another interesting question, not answered, is whether the right
to counsel is limited only to felony cases. In Gideon v. Wainwright
there is no indication that the right to be represented by counsel
would apply to misdemeanors and petty offenses. Mr. Justice
Harlan, in a concurring opinion, said: "Whether the rule should
extend to all criminal cases need not now be decided."' 10 8
In Evans v. Rives, °9 a District of Columbia minor child support
conviction (a federal misdemeanor) the court said: "And so far as
the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution
draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period and
such loss for a long one."
More recently, in Harvey v. Mississippi,'" the defendant was
charged with a state misdemeanor of "possession of whiskey." The
defendant informally entered a plea of guilty to the Justice of the
Peace and, during his trial, the defendant was not represented by
counsel. After his conviction and sentence were pronounced, the
defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, which was denied. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded and held that failure to notify
the defendant of his right to assistance of counsel invalidated his
guilty plea and rendered his conviction and incarceration constitu-
tionally improper.
The Harvey case extends much farther than the Evans case
because it permitted counsel in those cases which might be classi-
fied as petty or summary offenses as distinguished from high mis-
demeanors.
In any event, the type of offenses for which counsel must be
108. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
109. 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
110. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
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provided will continue to remain unclear until there is further pro-
nouncement by the Supreme Court. One may be sure that in the
not too distant future such a decision will be forthcoming.
V. WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
BY THE ACCUSED
While the accused may have the constitutional right to assist-
ance of counsel and other rights, he may also intelligently and
understandingly waive them. The constitutional right does not force
counsel upon an accused who wants no counsel.""' A waiver is or-
dinarily defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. 11 2 The principles of waiver enunciated
in a federal criminal case apply equally to a state court proceed-
ing."3 The mere failure of an individual accused of a crime to re-
quest counsel at the plea of guilty may not, in itself, be construed
as a waiver of his right to counsel." 4
What are some of the factors to be considered in determining
whether the accused intelligently and understandingly waived his
right to counsel? The record must show that the accused knew
the nature of the crime charged against him, was advised or aware
of his right to counsel, and, if indigent or otherwise unable to secure
counsel, that he was advised or was aware of his right to have
assigned counsel, and, if he refused, that his refusal was made
intelligently and understandingly." 5
The accused is not entitled to be represented by legal counsel
when questioned by police officers. A confession is not invalidated
merely because a defendant was not represented by counsel at the
time it was given. The rationale appears to be on the basis that
the interrogation is not a constitutionally protected right and the
doctrine of waiver is inapplicable. 11
6
The defendant may waive his right to counsel in open court
and may proceed to defend himself without his attorney."' Thus,
the defendant may waive his constitutional rights, if it is his free,
competent and intelligent act, and without the necessity of counsel.
Furthermore, if the accused pleads guilty at a time when he
111. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957).
112. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
113. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962).
114. Com. ex rel. O'Lock v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964).
115. Ibid.
116. Hayden v. State, 199 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1964); Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 199
A.2d 773 (1964), Com. ex rel. Chapman v. Maroney, 414 Pa. 76, 198 A.2d 548 (1964);
Marion v. State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Cr. App. 1964). Cf. People v. Curry, 42 Cal. Rptr.
513 (1965).
117. Dodds v. Haskins, 1 Ohio St. 2d 82, 204 N.E.2d 229 (1965) ; Com. ex rel. Edwards
v. Myers, 405 Pa. 190, 175 A.2d 70 (1961).
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is represented by counsel, the accused waives his right to question
the proceedings prior to that time.1 18
Therefore, the courts should indulge every reasonable presump-
tion against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and not
presume acquiescence in their loss. 1 9
Once the defendant makes a choice not to raise a constitutional
right, he may not later, long after the final stages of the direct
litigation have passed, claim that everything that followed the origin-
al decision should be set aside. The defendant may seek to do this
so that he may have a second chance of interposing a delayed
objection in the hope of achieving his acquittal. To permit the
defendant to disregard the procedural requirements of timely ob-
jection would disrupt the orderly adjudication of criminal actions,
defeat the legitimate state interest, and destroy the justification of
the waiver concept.2
0
CONCLUSION
In the case of Gideon v. Wainwright,12 1 the U. S. Supreme Court
held that a convict must be released from prison because he was
not represented by counsel at his trial in a non-capital case. It
not only handed down a landmark decision but has created an em-
ergency in the courts throughout the country. Literally hundreds
of prisoners are trying to gain their freedom and the application
for the writ of habeas corpus has assumed a new importance.
This article attempts to up-date this historical writ and set forth
the impact of the right to assistance of counsel in a legal idiom.
This article considers the circumstances under which the writ
of habeas corpus will or will not issue. The recent tendency of
the courts, especially the Supreme Court of the United States, has
been to relax the general rule that a writ of habeas corpus is
not a substitute for an appeal or for a writ of error for a motion
for a new trial or the correction of trial errors, and to expand
the scope of due process so as to allow a writ of habeas corpus
when the interest of justice demands it.
More and more, the Supreme Court of the United States is
reading the entire Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. What was originally intended to be a limit-
ation upon congressional action affecting personal liberties has been
118. Harris v. U.S., 338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964) ; State v. Murphy, 97 Ariz. 14, 396 P.2d
250 (1964) ; People v. Perry, 40 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. App. 1964) ; Gifford v. Maxwell, 177
Ohio St. 77, 202 N.E.2d 424 (1964) ; Corn. ex rel. Parker v. Myers, 414 Pa. 427, 200 A.2d
770 (1964).
119. Weed v. U.S., 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); U.S. v. Roche, 36 F.R.D. 413 (D.C.
Conn. 1965); Corn. em rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964).
120. U.S. ex rel. Kaiser v. Mahan, 233 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. N.J. 1964); In re Lessard, 42
Cal. Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39 (1965) ; Corn. ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d
810 (1965).
121. Supra, n. 108.
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construed by the Supreme Court of the United States as a limita-
tion upon state action as well. Since the entire first amendment
was made applicable to the states, 122 one might rhetorically question
which of the other seven amendments should not apply to the states.
It comes as no surprise with the advent of Mapp123 and Gideon121
that the fourth and sixth amendments are equally applicable. This
is a discernible trend and, if the Court keeps chiseling away at the
Bill of Rights as it has in the past, it is safe to predict that, in
the not too distant future, the Court will in one fell swoop in-
corporate the entire Bill of Rights within the meaning of "liberty"
under the fourteenth amendment.
An attempt is made to explain and distinguish habeas corpus
procedures in the state and federal courts. There are two basic
prerequisites for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in the
federal courts: (1) the state court remedies must have been ex-
hausted, and (2) the accused must show a violation of some con-
stitutional right.
An effort is made to discuss the right to have effective counsel
appointed for an indigent prisoner; the commencement and termin-
ation of the right to counsel, and the retroactive effect of Gideon
is then considered. Some recent state court interpretations of the
Escobedo1 25 and Massiah"26 decisions, leading to conflicting views,
are briefly touched upon. The question of whether Gideon is limit-
ed to felony cases or extends to misdemeanors and petty offenses
rounds out this aspect of the problem.
Finally, the article takes a look at the concept that there may
be a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. The finding of
waiver by the court depends on the stage of the proceedings, pre-
judice to the accused, and the specific right waived.
The Gideon case imposes a tremendous responsibility on the
courts. The courts are faced with the dilemma of balancing the
constitutional right of the accused to assistance of counsel and at
the same time protecting society from the hardened criminals now
seeking their liberty. Men, regardless of their status, have certain
basic rights because of their dignity as human beings which must
be recognized. The courts have always measured up to their
responsibilities in the past and, in the name of justice, will do so
in the future. For justice means respecting the rights of others
and the courts are the guardians of those rights.
122. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
123. Supra, n. 49.
124. Supra, n. 108.
125. Supra, n. 48.
126. Supra, n. 90
